When this piece was originally written anyone suggesting that Disney would be making a drama series in which Brendan Hughes, a legendary member of the IRA, would have a significant part would have been certifiably away with the fairies. Yet Say Nothing starts screening this Friday on Disney Plus. As sure as the turning of the earth I will review it, but in the meantime there is context about The Dark (as he was known) and his involvement with the Price sisters who enabled the killing of Jean McConville by the Belfast IRA, the story at the heart of the series.

Hughes was an incorruptible man and the “Belfast was rotten” clip below has him explaining how thoroughly infiltrated the Belfast IRA was by the British. He comes close to saying that the Adams / McGuinness leadership knew and tolerated this. 

Jean McConville lived in Divis Flats, arguably the most dismal part of west Belfast at the time. She was a widow with ten children, and unusually for the time was a Protestant who had married a Catholic.

The British army had given her a radio transmitter so that she could provide them with information would certainly result in the arrest or killing of IRA volunteers. Hughes says in the book reviewed below that he confiscated the transmitter, interrogated her and released her with a warning not to repeat this behaviour. He says she was treated leniently because she was a woman. 

Her British handlers gave her another transmitter despite knowing that she had been uncovered. She was was seized by the IRA again and Hughes says that there was an discussion in which Gerry Adams argued for killing her and disappearing the body and IRA commander Ivor Bell said that she should be killed and her body left were it could be found, the normal way of dealing with informers. Adams has always denied being involved in the killing, even falsely claiming that he was in prison when it happened. Hughes says that he agreed with Bell’s view.

The original review

This book may prove to be one of the most influential accounts of the Republican Movement’s rise and political and military collapse. It is the first in a planned series commissioned by the Boston College Oral History Archive on the Troubles In Northern Ireland. It is marred by one of the putrescent conceits of the peace and reconciliation industry, the unspoken assertion that there was a symmetry between the organisations representing the major political currents in society in the north of Ireland in the period that opened in 1968 and ended with Sinn Fein’s entry into government.  

In his introduction to Voices From The Grave Ed Moloney, the book’s principal author, says of Brendan Hughes that he died “believing that the struggle he had waged had been lost and betrayed”. To which we can add that after death his body was humiliated by being dumped in a common grave with UVF ideologue David Ervine whose recollections fill the second half.

Hughes was interviewed in 2001 and 2002 and the deal was all the participants’ contributions would only be made public after their deaths as the historians set out to record eye witness accounts from major figures in the the post 1968 period. Hughes’ account of his own life, told without bragging, goes a long way to explaining why he would not have wanted too much in the public domain while he was still alive.

The man seemed to be most alive when fighting British imperialism and it didn’t make much of difference if this was in gun battles, in prison, smuggling weapons or gathering intelligence. He was active in the IRA when it was dragged from a coma to take part in the defence of Catholic ghettoes against pogroms and went on to spend most of his life in the organisation until he broke with Gerry Adams. The book must make very uncomfortable reading for the Republican leadership. In the Movement’s own terms Hughes is unimpeachable. He immediately returned to active service after a thirteen year prison sentence and was intimately involved in a large number of major operational decisions and internal disputes.

He throws a harsh light on some of the IRA’s actions. In plain defiance of Republican ideology sections of the IRA carried out a number of explicitly sectarian killings of Protestants. Adams, Hughes and their co-thinkers were outraged by this, correctly identifying the low political level of some cadre as a problem. This problem, according to Hughes, had been amplified by a counter-insurgency strategy of selectively arresting those in the IRA leadership who were opposed to it. The response developed by Adams while in prison was to develop a “politically educated rank and file”.  However Ed Moloney displays a better grasp than did the IRA leadership of how incidents like Bloody Friday, in which large numbers of shoppers and workers were killed by IRA bombs in Belfast, isolated the Movement and made possible the destruction of the defended ghettoes in Belfast and Derry.

This lack of political clarity was a constant thread. If Hughes is to be believed Martin Mc Guinness felt that it was going to be possible to use weapons supplied by Libya to launch an Irish Tet Offensive to  break the British will to stay in Ireland. This would mean that a fighting organisation of, let’s be generous and say 1000, would wear down the British Army militarily resting on a very narrow social and geographical base and with a defeated mass movement following the Hunger Strikes.

There were big contradictions in Brendan Hughes politics. In the same interview he says both “The revolutionary socialist direction… that I was fighting for has been dropped. And all Sinn Fein has done and all the IRA has done is just to become another SDLP” (p.292) yet on the previous page “I always saw myself until I served a few years in prison as a soldier, not a politician”. In those sentences he perfectly expressed the big failing of militant Republicanism. While he accepted the necessity of turning a military campaign outward to a political struggle he did not feel that part of his responsibility was to help elaborate the politics. His preference was for fighting and organising. This meant that by the time he had developed a critique of the Adams’ leadership’s trajectory he was not in a position to do anything about it. In common with many other dissenters he framed the politics in terms of betrayal. He more or less openly asserts in the interviews that the British state went through another process of selective killings and arrests to breed a leadership team around Adams which was sympathetic to ending the armed struggle and the subsequent compromises. However given that the militarists lacked a strategy beyond more and bigger bombs in England the end result was inevitable.

No Republican leader ever satisfactorily explained in public just how the armed struggle was supposed to defeat the British. It was simply asserted as an abstract and timeless right. By the end the level of penetration of the IRA from top to bottom was astounding. Hughes was offered the job of restructuring counter-intelligence but refused on the grounds that there was no in Belfast he could trust for certain. Corruption and unambiguous criminality made that a lot easier for the state. One British agent had been offering mortgages, cash and transport to senior IRA figures. Hughes claim that he was killed to prevent a thorough investigation into the extent of the corruption. On a lower, perhaps more squalid level, he was disgusted by the relationship between some building firms and Sinn Fein. The firms employed former prisoners who were given their below minimum wage pay packets in pubs owned by the same people. It was a small symptom of the Movement’s degeneration.

What of Adams’ plan to create a “politically educated rank and file”? Hughes verdict is recognisable to anyone who has followed Sinn Fein’s “debates”. “We’ve been told all along that this is not a leadership led movement that this a movement led by the rank and file. That’s a load of bollocks. This is a movement led by the nose by a leadership that refuses to let go and anyone who objects to it, anyone who has an alternative is either ridiculed, degraded, shot or put out of the game altogether.”  In life that was his fate. In death, through the testimony that he has given in this indispensable book, he may help the next revolutionary generation draw up the failed balance sheet of Republican militarism.

A few brief words about David Ervine. He fancied himself something of a socialist. His was that special brand of working class politics that thought it was perfectly reasonable to shoot a young woman of eighteen who was going out with someone of a different religion. That’s what Karl Liebknecht was thinking of when he talked about “a bastard edition of socialism for stupid people.”

21 responses to “Voices From The Grave (updated 2024)”

  1. I’ve been working my way through this, but haven’t finished it yet. I don’t buy the line about Hughes’ opposition to sectarian attacks. Firstly, he admits that in 1969 – when Hughes wasn’t in the IRA – to asking an IRA member to fire into a Protestant crowd, which the guy refused to do as he was under explicit orders from Jimmy Sullivan, the local O/C who would go on to be prominent in The Workers’ Party, to fire only above their heads. Hughes also admits to being part of a mob that the IRA under Sullivan’s command prevented from launching a sectarian assault on Protestant homes with the intention of burning them out. By Hughes’ own admission, these were people he knew.
    We should also remember that not one provisional was punished or expelled for these numerous sectarian killings.

    In fact, in many cases, they went on to become leading figures when Adams, Bell and Hughes took over. One prime example being Bik McFarlane. They were so outraged, they made him O/C of the H Blocks during the Hunger Strikes. Hughes’ attempt to blame the sectarian killings and bombings on the British for allowing them to happen is a total negation of the fact that the responsibility for them lies overwhelmingly on those who carried them out. It’s hardly like there were no sectarian killings by the provisionals before the trio went inside at the same time or after they came out.

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  2. I haven’t yet read the book and so can’t comment on the quotes Garibaldy gives above, but to simply equate the Provos with a sectarian war is to conflate the whole of the Troubles to sectarianism and give credence to the “two tribes” narrative, which seems to miss the boat to me. Without excusing for a moment the sectarian attacks the Provisionals perpetrated, which were most certainly done, when a sectarian war is launched against you, as was launched by the Orange State and loyalist mobs against Nationalists in the late 60s, when you defend yourself or resist, it too looks sectarian (how could it not be? they are victims of a sectarian assault!). Were nationalist communities supposed to let themselves be burned out so that they might not look “sectarian” by resisting the (explicitly) loyalist assault on them? Even if you allow for defense, given the situation it was bound to be a horribly imprecise, confused and contradictory. While the Provos most certainly exacerbated sectarian tensions, it’s not as if the invented them. The Orange State did that.

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  3. I would count, prominently, among the sectarian crimes of the Provos are the Provos in peace. The Good Friday Agreement and The Saint Andrews Accord, both of which have strengthened (institutionalized) sectarianism far more than Enniskillen or the Shankhill (abominations though they were).

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  4. RR,

    There is a difference between defending your own home or area, and attacking another area. And definitely a difference with driving into the Shankill Road, and bombing a bar and shooting into it. Nothing sectarian in defending yourself. The IRA did everything it could to defend areas under attack in 1969. But it didn’t go on to assault protestant areas. The difference seems to me to lie in Sullivan’s actions – commanded the defence of the lower Falls against the protestant sectarian mob but prevented a sectarian mob burning protestant homes.

    And there were no attempts to burn homes in 1974-5 during the period Liam is talking about. So, with respect, talking about Bombay Street is distracting from the point in hand to some extent.

    I’d agree with you about the problems with the current political arrangements entrenching sectarianism, but they are massively better than what went before.

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  5. Clearly, the absence of a futile war is preferable to a futile peace…at least in the short and medium term. However, wasn’t that futile war handmaiden to the GFA and St. Andrews? That Sunningdale didn’t fly is testimony to that. I find it hard to draw such hard and fast lines between the Provo campaign (armed) and the Provo campaign (Unarmed). The Provo leaders ideas of “national liberation” were never going to break out of the sectarian shell, it’s how they defined the world. Of course the Provos see it as ending the Orange State, which I suppose it was. It’s just that the settlement is as sectarian in its way as the Orange State was in its. Those that voted for or support the GFA as an alternative to war are not without guilt in its outcome, because it was what was openly on offer. Didn’t the Workers Party support the referendum?

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  6. I meant to say the “presence of a futile peace is preferable to a futile war” Apologies to Liam for the space I’ve taken.

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  7. The state as it had stood was wrecked by the civil rights movement, and the response of the most reactionary elements of unionism, which showed it up for what it was. Due to NICRA, gerrymandering went, one man one vote came in, and the Housing Executive was created. The old system was gone, and London was planning for power-sharing. In that sense, the violence added nothing that wouldn’t have been in place from the early 1970s, and most likely delayed it.

    I guess we’ll never know if Sunningdale would have stuck without the violence (and not just from the Provos it must be said). I agree with your point about the Provos not being able to come out of their sectarian shell, and that the fundamental raison d’etre of their movement hasn’t changed in so far as it represents the aggressive assertion of the interests of northern catholics.

    The WP did back the referendum, with reservations. The analysis was that the murder of working class people for their religion had to be stopped, both on principle and for progressive politics to have any chance to flourish. What the peace has demonstrated is how deeply sectarian the whole of society in the north is, and that the violence wasn’t the result only of small groups, but of the very structure of society. Sectarianism must be challenged at that level. There have been minor fracturings of the two all-class blocs on class lines or on the grounds of normal politics, and hopefully that process will continue as devolution forces the two blocs to show their true nature as dominated by the interests of the bourgeoisie. That’s why The WP thought it was important to back the GFA despite its many problems.

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  8. Not to belabor the point, but was there any indication that the Provos would have returned to war if the GFA had been voted down?. Didn’t they explicitly say Plan B was to make Plan A work, and failing that they agreed to St. Andrews. They did not return to war. The failures of the St. Andrews accords have led to further capitulations, not more militancy on their part. In deed, it is those capitulations that are, in part, fueling the militarist campaigns. Equating opposition to the GFA with a return to war limits the options to the GFA, which is what those who campaigned and endorsed ended up doing. And now look where we are; stuck with the GFA (mark II or III or whatever) or war for real because nothing else was on offer. Time to offer something else.

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  9. Well they had done so from 1996-7, so it wasn’t as clear to everybody then the way they were moving. The tactical use of armed struggle thing was still in the air.

    It wasn’t just a matter of violence though. It was also about devolution, the civic forum, and the bill of rights. All these held the potential to promote progressive politics. It’s worth noting that the civic forum was crushed by a combination of the assembly parties, and that the reason we are still waiting on a bill of rights is not solely because of unionist intransigence, but partly because of the absurd idea of writing unionist rights and nationalist rights into it, and issues relating to opposition to parades.

    I still think the best opportunity to grow progressive politics lies in locally-accountable institutions as opposed to direct rule.

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  10. It seemed to me that Hughes’ considered opinion after the event was that Jimmy Sullivan had taken the right decision, which of course it was. Making judgements like that is one of the things that distinguishes an angry crowd from a political militant.

    It seemed to me that Hughes’ considered opinion after the event was that Jimmy Sullivan had taken the right decision, which of course it was. Making judgments like that is one of the things that distinguishes an angry crowd from a political militant.

    Some of the Republicans’ attacks in Protestant areas showed a disregard for civilian life and they would not have attempted bombings like those on the Shankhill Road and in Enniskillen in Nationalist areas. Hughes does accept that some murders were simply sectarian. However this was not the main thrust of Republican military strategy and had an aberrational quality. By way of contrast the constant theme in Loyalist violence from Gusty Spence’s first murder to Lenny Murphy and Billy Wright was random indiscrimate sectarian killing. Ervine even makes the point that when the British Army and the police were stuffing intelligence files through their letter boxes that they preferred to go out and kill random Taigs.

    That’s more than a small difference.

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  11. Liam,

    I wouldn’t dispute that the loyalists were more nakedly sectarian than their nationalists counterparts (although that logic applies less to the INLA and in particular the IPLO). However, I would dispute that sectarian killings by the provisionals had an aberrational quality. There was so many of them and over such a long period, that I don’t believe that can be the case, especially when we look at the fact some of those responsible ended up in very senior positions. It wasn’t the main focus of their activity, but it was far from a minor part of it. A lot of it depended on geography too. In huge swathes of say west Belfast, you would see the British and the RUC but never a protestant, and so the focus would be on them. In places like the Ardoyne and the New Lodge, where they were both, then the picture was much more mixed.

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  12. the quotation about the “socialism of fools” is by August Bebel, not by Liebknecht

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  13. “loyalists were more nakedly sectarian than their nationalists counterparts” I think the point Liam and I are trying to make is that they are not counterparts. Missing in this discussion is British imperialism. Imperialism is at the root of sectarianism in Ireland. Hughes knew that and fought against. Folks like Ervine knew it and fought for it.

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  14. It is far too simplistic to simply blame imperialism for sectarianism. Never mind the historical roots of sectarianism in the early modern period, but in our own day to blame it all on the Brits denies any agency to people, especially working class people. I’ve always found that an odd position for people to take who build their political life upon the notion of independent working class political action.

    Surely the whole current process is proof that the reality that persuasion of the people who live in Ireland and want to maintain the link with Britain is the only possible option has been understood by nearly everyone in Ireland.

    And I fail to see, by the way, how even if imperialism was responsible that made sectarian killings forgiveable. Or for that matter tribal politics in a peaceful scenario. I realise you don’t think it does, but I’m not sure what the invocation of imperialism as the cause adds to the problem of finding a socialist solution. It is clear that the problem will be solved in the six counties, not in London or even Dublin, though each of those will have a role to play.

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  15. “Imperialism is at the root of sectarianism in Ireland. Hughes knew that and fought against. Folks like Ervine knew it and fought for it.”
    There is simply no logic here – money is the root of all evil, but if I set fire to the £20 I have in my pocket it will not significantly diminish the evil that exists in the world. It could be argued that British imperialism (not in the Leninist sense of course, but neither can the presence of the English state in Ireland from the 12th century be compared to imperialism in the Leninist sense) lies at the root of racism in the United States, but it sure as hell has had a long and healthy existence since the roots were cut off. And I suspect sectarianism will last a long time in the north of Ireland whatever state rules there. Especially if sectarian killings continue to be hailed as anti-imperialist acts.

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  16. My old man was a scot ,my ma a paddy.My old man never walked into a chapple,my ma lived their.What one do i shoot.

    Comrades and their fallouts eh,battles lost battles won,who carriers the pragmatice line,them in the hole, or them that put them there.

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  17. If you want a revolution, embrase the book of Marks Engels, good book. Fell out big time did the provider with the recipient ,about violence .Something about it being anti-social.

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  18. What was it the man said about those who do not learn from history?

    http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/northern_ireland/8638255.stm

    Senior police sources said there is evidence of increasing communication and co-operation between dissident factions, working together on logistics, weapons, planning and carrying out attacks, and that has increased the threat they pose.

    Dissidents have carried out 10 attacks this year, but the police have prevented many more potential attacks.

    Intelligence suggests that about 50 dissident “operations”, including targeting and planning, have been disrupted this year.

    The increasing co-operation was evident in the car bomb attack on Palace Barracks, in Holywood, the headquarters of MI5, shortly after midnight on the 12th of April, just minutes after policing and justice powers were devolved to the Stormont Assembly.

    The attack also demonstrated improved technical ability that is causing concern in security circles.

    “There is no evidence of new developments or improved technology, we believe they’re been researching, developing and testing previously used techniques and have now got it right

    Police source
    Dissidents have tried to mount a number of bomb attacks in the past, but failed for a variety of reasons.

    A car bomb abandoned outside Castlewellan in January 2009 was defused; a landmine in Forkhill didn’t explode; neither did a number of devices in County Fermanagh; and then a car bomb placed outside the headquarters of the policing board in November 2009 only partially exploded.

    Then a 250 lb car bomb exploded outside Newry courthouse in February followed last week by the bomb at the gates of the offices of MI5.

    Police believe those two devices, and the car bomb at the policing board, have a common thread – they were all constructed by bomb makers in the border area and then passed on to other dissidents who attached the final components, like firing packs and timer units.

    Security sources believe dissident bomb makers in the border area have now perfected their techniques after a period of research and development, and are supplying other dissidents with “ready to use packages”.

    Police sources describe the south Armagh and north Louth area as the “crucible” of dissident republican bomb making.

    The car bomb used in Newry simply had to be driven a short distance across the border, but the car placed outside the policing board, packed with an oil drum that contained around 400 lbs of explosives, was driven to Belfast and then handed over to those who later planted it.

    The device that exploded outside Holywood barracks, which contained around 100-120 lbs of explosives, was brought to Belfast in a beer barrel and then placed inside a hijacked taxi.

    There is not a centralised “engineering department” like the Provisional IRA operated during the troubles, and the police don’t know how many bomb makers are involved.

    The security services believe dissidents pose a greater threat
    What they do know is that technical problems that may have prevented previous bombs exploding appear to have been overcome.

    Police believe some of those involved are former members of the Provisional IRA as the car bombs are similar to devices used in the early 1990s.

    Significantly, police sources said none of the car bombs have contained Semtex or any other commercial explosives as they are built in a way that doesn’t require a booster charge.

    “This is old school,” one source said.

    “There is no evidence of new developments or improved technology.

    “We believe they’ve been researching, developing and testing previously used techniques and have now got it right.”

    The threat is now regarded as the most severe since a Real IRA bombing campaign in 1997-1998, when large devices exploded in a number of towns, including Banbridge and Moira, before 29 people were killed in the attack in Omagh in August 1998.

    The threat against individual police officers also remains high.

    The vast majority of the 50 or so dissident “operations” disrupted this year involved plans for attacks on officers, and dissidents are said to be increasingly targeting officers on duty in a bid to make it impossible for them to operate on the streets in some areas.

    Getting more officers on to the streets and into communities is a stated policy objective of Chief Constable Matt Baggott.

    Police activity has increased in response to the growing threat. Already this year 64 people suspected of involvement in dissident activity have been arrested, and 18 have been charged – compared to 17 charges for the whole of last year.

    Detectives hope to learn lessons from the past.

    They are looking back, in some cases almost 20 years, to see if they can find forensic links between the recent bombings and previous attacks, and identify the bomb-makers.

    Police are also investigating the finances and other activities of individuals they believe are involved in dissident activity.

    The threat is likely to increase further in the weeks ahead as dissidents are expected to step up efforts to mount attacks during the election campaign.

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  19. […] have been episodes of Republican sectarian violence against Protestant. However Republicanism’s roots lie in the […]

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  20. […] from key participants in the post 1968 events in the north of Ireland.   Ed Moloney’s book came out earlier this year and it has been made into a TV programme by RTE. Unhappily you can’t […]

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